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Abstract R. G. Collingwood’s philosophical analysis of religious atonement as a
dialectical process of mortal repentance and divine forgiveness is explained and crit-
icized. Collingwood’s Christian concept of atonement, in which Christ= the Atone-
ment (and also= the Incarnation), is subject in turn to another kind of dialectic, in
which some of Collingwood’s leading ideas are first surveyed, and then tested against
objections in a philosophical evaluation of their virtues and defects, strengths and
weaknesses. Collingwood’s efforts to synthesize objective and subjective aspects of
atonement, and his proposal to solve the soteriological problem as to why God becomes
flesh, as a dogma of some Christian belief systems, is finally exposed in adversarial
exposition as inadequately supported by one of his main arguments, designated here
as Collingwood’s Dilemma. The dilemma is that sin is either forgiven or unforgiven
by God. If God forgives sin, then God’s justice is lax, whereas if God does not forgive
sin, then, also contrary to divine nature, God lacks perfect loving compassion. The
dilemma is supposed to drive philosophy toward a concept of atonement in which the
sacrifice of Christ is required in order to absolve God of the lax judgment objection.
God forgives sin only when the price of sin is paid, in this case, by the suffering
and crucifixion of God’s avatar. The dilemma can be resolved in another way than
Collingwood considers, undermining his motivation for synthesizing objective and
subjective facets of the concept of atonement for the sake of avoiding inconsistency.
Collingwood is philosophically important because he asks all the right questions about
religious atonement, and points toward reasonable answers, even if he does not always
deliver original philosophically satisfactory solutions.
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Collingwood’s philosophy of religion
The logical and metaphysical dimensions of religious atonement, in a dialectic of
repentance and divine forgiveness, is implicit in much of theological and theistic philo-
sophical thought and discourse. The concept of atonement requires an understanding
of nothing less than the relation between God and each individual soul. It is by act of
will that a sinner commits a sin, by another act of will that the sinner may repent and
seek forgiveness, and by still another act of divine will that the sinner is forgiven. In his
quirky 1916 book, Religion and Philosophy, R.G. Collingwood describes a dialectical
process of religious atonement, involving a reciprocal participation of human sinner
and divine judge, that occurs over several specific distinct moments in a kind of dance:
Here we seem to have a relation involving two separate activities, the divine and
the human. On the one hand there is the initiation of the repentance, the act of
punishment or forgiveness on the part of God; and on the other, the response to
God’s act, the repentance of man in virtue of the original self-expression of God
[i.e., the Incarnation].1
Collingwood’s thoughts on religious atonement and the relation between God and
sinners offer a unique perspective on a central theological problem. The insightful
philosophical content, given, or perhaps despite, the limitations of Collingwood’s
explicit Christian religious orientation and faith, can be appreciated as raising impor-
tant questions for philosophy of religion, even if Collingwood is not always considered
as yielding satisfactory answers. As an effort to understand the metaphysical presuppo-
sitions of theological discourse, Collingwood’s rigorous if occasionally flawed philo-
sophical analysis of the concept of religious atonement as a dialectical process between
willful acts of repentant sinners and a forgiving God, a rarity within the relevant philo-
sophical literature on religious concepts, deserves serious attention, regardless of the
reader’s own religious or philosophical inclinations.
What follows is an alternately explanatory and critical exposition, in which Colling-
wood’s concept of religious atonement is explained and tested, weighed against objec-
tions, and finally evaluated for its philosophical strengths and weaknesses, moving
from principal to peripheral topics, as Collingwood in his 1916 treatise explores the
concept of religious atonement personified in the incarnation of Christ. The picture of
Collingwood’s philosophy of religion that emerges at the end of this critical exposi-
tion emphasizes ideological characteristics of Collingwood’s religious philosophical
thinking, in the course of explaining both its explanatory resources and deficiencies.
1 Collingwood (1997 [1916], pp. 180–181).
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Dual-aspect metaphysics of atonement
Philosophy of religion sometimes assumes the theoretical burden of explaining the
kind of relational and especially epistemic and metaphysical properties that might be
ascribed to those seeking atonement with God. Collingwood describes the elements
of the essential religious moments in a process of atonement as a series of ontically
reductive Christianized identities, whereby Collingwood maintains that Christ = the
Incarnation = the Atonement.
The capitalization and definite article Collingwood introduces are intended to pro-
vide alternative proper names for Christ, once Collingwood’s theory of Christian
repentance and foregiveness as moments in the dialectical process of divine atone-
ment is advanced. To refer to atonement with no capitalization is just to invoke the
concept of repenting and being forgiven, whereas the Atonement for Collingwood is
made identical to the person of Christ, further identified as God’s Incarnation. The
conceptual interconnections of sincere repentance and divine forgiveness, in bringing
an individual human being and God together in harmonious, nondiscordant will, is
philosophically intriguing in its own right, even for those who do not share Colling-
wood’s Christian faith, and his discussion goes far to highlight some of the most
interesting philosophical aspects of what believers may mean by repentent sinners
seeking atonement with God.
Collingwood’s typographic convention is consistently followed here, speaking of
the general concepts of ‘atonement’ and ‘incarnation’ in lower-case, and of ‘the Incar-
nation’ and ‘the Atonement’, having grown capital letters, as alternative proper names
for what Collingwood takes to be the embodiment of God the Father in the historical
personage of Jesus Christ of Nazareth. We can then intelligibly apply Collingwood’s
distinction when inquiring into the atonement achieved by the Atonement, and of the
Atonement’s reconciling God and repentent sinners with no breach of divine justice,
by means of God’s incarnation in the Incarnation.2
The explanation reflects fundamental religious attitudes that can overlap with philo-
sophical conclusions concerning the nature of soul in the living experience of each
individual consciousness. The sinner’s efforts to return to God can reinforce the
penitent’s grasp of being related as a single mortal creature to the will and moral
judgment of a divine creator, the Creator. Collingwood proposes a dual-aspect meta-
physics of atonement in its relation to repentance and forgiveness. Part III, Chapter
II of Collingwood’s study, marks the Christian-philosophical dramatic denouement,
in which Collingwood, having prepared the necessary background, devotes full atten-
tion to the problem of understanding divine atonement. More unexpectedly, perhaps,
Collingwood in this context and from this perspective also addresses the incarnation
or soteriological problem, as to why God is supposed to have been born as human
flesh. Collingwood thereby attempts to draw philosophically interesting connections
between divine atonement and incarnation.
The idea that Atonement and Incarnation should be explained as dual aspects of
the same religiously significant phenomenon, the supposed embodiment of God in the
2 See also the essays collected in Collingwood (1968). Hogan (1989). Johnson (1998).
123
154 Int J Philos Relig (2014) 76:151–170
humanity of Christ, requires an adroit application of Collingwood’s conceptual ana-
lytic and synthetic philosophical skills. The argument reflects Collingwood’s back-
ground knowledge and capabilities as a professional historian and philosopher of
history and its methods, and depends especially on his familiarity with the history
of Christianity and Christian philosophy. So focused and finally fervent is Colling-
wood’s own Christian sentiments in the book, that as the later chapters unfold, there
is virtually nothing said, even at the sociological level, concerning other religions.
Nor, despite Collingwood’s quite general reference for these reflections in the book’s
title, is any significant foray into comparative religions made from the standpoint of
Collingwood’s dual aspect life of Christ’s nature as fusion of the Incarnation and
Atonement.
Thus, Collingwood characteristically explains: ‘By the central doctrine of Chris-
tianity I mean that taking-up of humanity into God which is called the Incarnation or
the Atonement, according as the emphasis is laid on God’s self-expression through
humanity or man’s redemption through the spirit of God.’3 Collingwood leads every-
where throughout his philosophical inquiry with the concept of Atonement, making
it primary in his explanations. To this starting place, the concept of Incarnation is
eventually brought into the picture with its own conceptual baggage as the most phys-
ically intimate, and hence most religiously significant, historical moment of contact
between human beings and God. Atonement seems to explain the need for incarnation,
as much as incarnation, properly understood, explains the nature of divine atonement.
The asymmetry between these dual aspects for Collingwood remains that there can be
no atonement without God’s incarnation as Christ, although logically speaking it is the
need for atonement rather than the Atonement itself that motivates, philosophically
justifies, and explains the Incarnation.4
The challenge in understanding this central part of Collingwood’s Christian phi-
losophy of religion is that of filling in some of the blanks tantalizingly left open in his
characterization of the metaphysical status of divine atonement, in which the figure of
Jesus Christ is supposed to be simultaneously in alternate lights both Incarnation and
Atonement. The ontology on which Collingwood’s philosophy of religion seems to
be governed at its most basic level is one that emphasizes atonement as a vital process
involving several stages, a series of events taking place in time affecting the properties
of objects as they unfold in a specific dialectic.
Atonement, sincere repentance, and forgiveness, are the three moments or stages
in a complex dialectic, arrived at through an act of the sinner’s will in relation to
3 Collingwood (1997 [1916], p. 147).
4 Collingwood explains his understanding of religious doctrine in the form of propositionally expressed
belief as essential to religion as he understand the concept, at least for his purposes in the book. See ibid.,
p. 12: ‘Now the Doctrine of God is of course theology; it is in fact the translation of that word. Accordingly,
a creed is a theology, and there is no distinction whatever between Theology and Religion, so far as the
intellectual aspect of religion is concerned. My theology is the beliefs I hold about God, that is to say, my
creed, the intellectual element of my religion.’ Ibid.: ‘Without examining further theories of the same kind,
therefore, we may venture to assert that religion cannot exist without a definite belief as to the nature of
God. This contention would probably be borne out by any careful investigation of actual religions; every
religion claims to present as true and intellectually sound a doctrine which may be described as a theory of
God.’
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God’s merciful judgment. The two voices in the dialectic are the sincerely repentant
mortal sinner seeking atonement, and a perfectly benevolent forgiving God. Spiritual
atonement, for Collingwood, with his explicit Christian leanings, as remarked, is only
to be found in the Atonement, which is to say in different words, the Incarnation, God in
human form, Jesus of Nazareth, as mortal avatar of a triune Godhead. For Collingwood,
the drama that unfolds after Christ enters the Temple at Jersusalem as a moment in
his compassionate but revolutionary authority-defying ministry, subsequently paying
the penalty by crucifixion at the hands of presiding Roman officials, fully explains
the facts of Christian theological-philosophical soteriology. It accounts rationally for
why it is that God had to become human in the sense of historically inhabiting a man’s
flesh.
All these developments are methodologically interesting as a largely neglected
chapter of recent philosophy of religion. They constitute a remarkable chapter in
the considered reflections of a leading, widely-read, and professionally respected, if
somewhat out-of-mainstream, philosophical thinker of the time. The implications of
Collingwood’s concept of atonement are so fundamental, that philosophy of religion
cannot avoid the question as to whether he correctly understands the dialectics of
God’s forgiveness for repentant sinful acts of will.
Sincere repentance + forgiveness = atonement
The concept of religious atonement is literally that of becoming at-one. Atonement is
attained after committing an offense against another who is at first alienated from the
offender, and then brought back together in harmony. If I sin against God, whatever
this means in specific application, then I have estranged my will from God’s. I have
done something that God wills me not to do.
My subsequent atonement with God, if achievable, must bring my will back into
agreement with God’s. Needless to say, this does not mean that I come to will all
that God wills, or with anything remotely resembling the efficacy of God’s will. Only
that I begin again to will nothing that is contrary to God’s will, insofar as I hope to
understand whatever it is that God wills. It is religious teaching in some traditions to
consider atonement as a dual-aspect phenomenon that can alternatively be described
from complementary perspectives as an interrelation, almost a logical and conceptual
blending, of reciprocal psychological acts of penitence and forgiveness. The offender
must be truly penitent, and the offended must truly forgive, in order for the distinct
moments in an act of atonement to take place.
Sincere repentance as manifested by reformed behavior in better conformity with
an understanding of God’s will logically implies forgiveness from a morally perfect
being. Therewith, God’s will and the will of the repentant sinner in this limited respect
are made at-one. The sinner then attains a first or restored atonement with what is
perceived to be God’s will. The subordination of individual to divine will that is
assumed in many religions is negotiated in this way, and is psychologically a factor
for many persons in the pursuit of moral harmony and peace of mind. Ardent Christian
believers sometimes speak of needing to get right with God, where the main part of
what this means seems to be explicable as divine atonement. Whereas my neighbor
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may stubbornly choose not to forgive me for letting my goat loose in his yard, even after
I apologise, make recompense, and make sure that it can never happen again, pasture
my goat elsewhere, have the animal for dinner, or the like, my neighbor and myself,
imperfect beings that we are, may remain as a matter of historical circumstances,
when all the facts are known to both, indefinitely estranged. God’s forgiveness as the
response of a perfectly benevolent, morally perfect merciful judge, in contrast, cannot
possibly be withheld, however unforced the attitude may also occur as a judgment of
God’s free will and divinely compassionate nature.
Atonement mortal and divine in Collingwood
Collingwood’s philosophical framework makes it possible to interpret some key histor-
ical facts surrounding Christ’s ministry in its conceptual cultural context. Yom Kippur,
in this connection, is widely known as the Jewish Day of Atonement, in which believ-
ers ask God for forgiveness of sins. It is preceded by Erev Yom Kippur, in which those
who want to ask God’s forgiveness the following day must first forgive others, effec-
tively their neighbors and peers. If a person cannot forgive others, then why expect
God to forgive one’s own sins or other moral or religious offenses?
From the standpoint also of Collingwood’s Christian philosophy of religion, the
practice of local forgiveness associated with Erev Yom Kippur can be understood to
lend significance to the fact that Jesus preached the Hebrew Testament maxim to love
one’s neighbor as oneself, before having a right to expect forgiveness for one’s own
sins before God. As one reads in Leviticus 19:18, NIV: ‘Do not seek revenge or bear a
grudge against one of your people, but love your neighbor as yourself’. If, as Colling-
wood believes, proceeding on philosophical grounds coincident with the main lines of
his Christian faith, that Jesus of Nazareth, later the Christ, is the living Incarnation of
God as embodied sin-forgiving Atonement, then it is natural to find Christ encouraging
local forgiveness of one’s neighbors, friends and especially enemies alike. Christ does
so often, when he preaches, specifically as a preparation for the greater atonement
that his incarnation is intended to confer on faithful believers. Christ as Incarnation-
Atonement, on a Collingwood-inspired dual-aspect interpretation of these moments in
the unfolding of Christ’s ministry, breaks the costly bonds of Jewish priestly authority
and offers direct contact in his own human person with God’s forgiveness. It is this
dual nature that Collingwood seems to believe Christ represents, in which every day
in spirit is both Erev Yom Kippur and Yom Kippur.
The most obvious deeply pervasive connection between Collingwood’s dual-aspect
nature of Christ as divine Atonement and human Incarnation is found in Colling-
wood’s effort to address the soteriological problem of how and why God might be
thought to have become flesh. Collingwood’s Christian philosophy of religion partly
absorbs and partly distances itself from a more or less doctrinal composite Christian
religious worldview. The soteriological problem is resolved in Collingwood’s phi-
losophy as the essential incarnation requirement for attaining atonement between
human sinners and God. It is meant to accord with what conventional nonphilo-
sophical believers have sometimes expected to be implied by God’s incarnation as
Jesus. God’s perfect benevolence, in accepting atonement without exception from
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those who are sincerely repentant in seeking forgiveness for their sins by making
their wills at one with God’s, completes the picture of Christian divine atonement.
Mankind through the person of Jesus is atoned, made at-one, with God, according
to a still surviving Hebrew Testament concept of attaining atonement, by the inter-
mediary of a sacrificial lamb of God, something that Collingwood argues could only
occur if Jesus were identical with God. Jesus is the Incarnation of and hence the
embodied Atonement of God’s will with the will of God’s human creation. As incar-
nated God, Jesus brings humanity and the divine together in his own person, while
in the story of the passion, Christ’s crucifixion appears politically as much a tale
of angry materialistic power struggle as of gracious forgiveness and divine atone-
ment.
Regardless of the factual historical merits of this part of the narrative, it is roughly the
composite story of Christ that Collingwood in his impassioned philosophical Christian-
ity seems unequivocally to accept. The philosophical portrait of Christ Collingwood
paints in two dimensions is that of God incarnated, and as such the most powerful
imaginable symbol of divine forgiveness. Collingwood considers divine atonement
to come in the form of, and as really nothing other than, God’s incarnation as Jesus.
God’s incarnation, the Incarnation, is Christ, and Christ, by virtue of being the Incar-
nation, is also thereby necessarily the Atonement. Incarnation implies atonement,
at the highest conceptual level for Collingwood, against a background of additional
metaphysical assumptions and devout commitments, about which he is mostly silent.
Atonement is historically revealed in the same moment that it is implemented as
the product of God’s infinitely good will in the incarnation of God in the person of
Christ.
It all fits tightly together, once the first steps are taken toward Collingwood’s analy-
sis. From a Christian philosophical or philosophical Christian standpoint, Colling-
wood’s exposition presents atonement and incarnation as two sides of the same
coin, when we grasp conceptually that the Atonement = the Incarnation = Jesus of
Nazareth, the Christ. Collingwood, who implies by the title of his book that he has
something to say about philosophy and religion generally, advances a philosoph-
ical concept of atonement that is not transportable to any other religions that do
not recognize that Jesus of Nazareth was the avatar of God, and or, as some later
Christian councils were eventually to decide, in some sense perhaps even identi-
cal with God or a part of God’s godhead, rather than merely a good man and wise
moral teacher. Collingwood’s arguments speak no word as to the concept of atone-
ment, if any, in the religious dogma and practice of faiths other than Christianity,
in which the concept of God’s human incarnation may not only be excluded, but
forbidden as heretical, altogether contrary to the faithful’s understanding of God’s
nature.
Inherently distorting objective atonement theologies
Collingwood develops his dual-aspect metaphysics of atonement by explaining that
repentance and forgiveness are not distinct dialectically unrelated occurrences, but
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‘inseparable aspects of one and the same process’, logically interimplicative when
combined with the background propositions Collingwood assumes.5
Atonement is a dialectical process involving two persons, the human sinner and
divine font of forgiveness. If we try to detach these moments of the process from one
another, then we are certain to arrive at a distorted understanding of the general concept
of atonement. The two resulting theories, emphasizing the human side of the process
exclusively while making the divine secondary, or vice versa, Collingwood refers to
respectively as the subjective and objective ‘theories’ of atonement. The two artificially
abstracted theories, detached from the common developing root and stem of atonement,
as an interbraiding of moments between sincere human penitence and divine forgive-
ness, he regards as doomed to fail in efforts to understand the nature of atonement. To
suggest an analogy that Collingwood does not consider, such explanatory folly would
be the equivalent of trying to understand the nature of money by concentrating only on
the material paper, metal, and plastic-electronic, in which monetary values are embod-
ied, without reference to the values themselves, or, contrariwise, only to the exchange
values of money considered in the abstract, without regard for its many different con-
crete forms of material embodiment. Collingwood in his own words similarly explains:
These are two inseparable aspects of one and the same process; the tendency to
lay exclusive emphasis on one or the other leads to two main types of theory,
each equally unsatisfactory because each, while really one-sided, claims to be
an account of the whole truth. These views I call the objective and subjective
theories, respectively.6
On the objective theory of Atonement, a sinner’s seeking atonement in the form of
forgiveness is also God’s doing, and the whole business is an act of God in several
movements. We may nevertheless be disappointed in asking whether the performance
of which Collingwood speaks also includes the sequence-initiating sin or falling out
of a presumed initial state of grace with God’s will on the part of the individual human
sinner. Completing the whole picture by beginning with an act of sin in transgress-
ing God’s will, as the originating occasion for atonement-seeking, would seem to
be demanded by logical consistency, although Collingwood does not acknowledge
the problem or recommend any provisions for supplying the omission. He merely
distinguishes:
(a) The objective theory of atonement points out that whatever change takes
place in the human will is due to the free gift of the Spirit of God. Men can
do nothing good except by virtue of God’s grace, and therefore, if the evil will
of man is converted into a good will, the whole process is an act of God. The
Atonement, the redemption of man, is a fact entirely on the side of God, not at
5 Ibid., p. 182: ‘In examining actual theories of the Atonement [event of the Incarnation], however, we must
bear in mind that a verbal statement which appears to be one-sided does not necessarily either neglect or
exclude the other side. The objective view is perfectly true so far as it goes; and the criticism often directed
against it, on the ground that redemption is a matter of the individual will alone and must arise entirely from
within, is due to a fallacious theory of personality.’
6 Collingwood (1997 [1916], p. 181).
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all on the side of man; for without God’s help and inspiration there would be
nothing good in man at all.7
If consistency is expected, Collingwood must affirm that atonement, in the existence
of the Atonement, is all God’s doing. It is all the unfurling, then, as he maintains, of
a divine ‘process’. God bends human will out of agreement with God’s will, and then
brings it back into being at one with God’s. If that is Collingwood’s concept, it does
not obviously make sense. How can God will to have a human being’s will not agree
with God’s will? If God wills such a thing, then whatever the human being wills to do
must be precisely part of what God wills, rather than something that could possibly
be out of step with God’s will. If God wills this first initial state moment of the total
Atonement process, then what a human being wills thereafter cannot logically be at
odds with any part of God’s will.
Moreover, how is it supposed to be thinkable on Collingwood’s assumptions for
God’s will ever to be opposed? If God truly wills something, how can God’s divine
causally efficacious omnipotent will conceivably be countermanded by any act of
human will? How can anything occur anywhere in the universe that is not necessarily
the expression of God’s will? God wills that no human being murder another, we
are encouraged to believe. In actually committing a murder, we nevertheless gener-
ally suppose that a killer blatantly defies God’s will, and thereby stands in need of
atonement.
The options here are few, if we are not simply to throw up our hands philosophically
and announce that whatever anyone chooses to believe is beyond the reach of justifi-
cation, and in some sense an irreducible matter of faith. We are certainly limited in one
otherwise promising direction, if we try to say that God has no will whatsoever, pro
or con, concerning what any human thinking acting psychological subject wills. Then
there will be no basis for atonement in the first place, as Collingwood understands the
remaining two-part process of sincere repentance and forgiveness. There can be no
motivation for restoring the wayward will of a human sinner to a state of being at one
with God’s will, with which it cannot logically conflict. Repentance for doing what,
in that event? Forgiveness for having done what? If God entertains no particular will
concerning what human beings might do or will to do, as Deists profess, then there
can be no atonement-originating moment of discord between finite human will and
whatever God wills to pave the way for reconcilation, in what Collingwood describes
as the remaining essential dialectical moments of repentance and forgiveness in the
process of atonement.
The philosophical justification for the ‘objective’ theory of atonement remains
powerful, in light of the consideration that the contribution of the human moment of
repentance to the process of atonement is incapable of accomplishing anything, of
taking even the first steps toward becoming at one with God’s will, without God’s
supportive activity and initiative:
7 Ibid.
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The divine grade of Atonement consists in the imparting not of a new ideal but
of a new power and energy to live up to the ideal. Man, in a word, cannot redeem
himself; his redemption comes from God and is God’s alone.8
The ‘objective’ God-originating and God-sustaining account of atonement is nev-
ertheless conceptually limited by the fact that redemption of the sinner is a matter
first of the sinner’s will, and of a change in the sinner’s will upon sincerely seeking
redemption in an act of divine forgiveness. If God is objectively totally responsible for
all three moments in the complete dramatic process of atonement, then there seems to
be no place left in the account for the sinner to willfully choose a return to agreement
with God’s will. Nor similarly is there then an opportunity for the penitent to arrive at
sincere independently motivated repentance in desiring to be at-one with God:
Now this “objective” view is exposed to the danger of forgetting that redemption
must be the redemption of a will, the change of a will; and that in the last resort
a will can only be changed by itself. If this is forgotten, the objective theory
lapses into an abstract legalism according to which grace becomes a fictitious
and conventional restoration to favor without any corresponding renovation of
character. These two things must never be allowed to fall apart in such a way that
the Atonement consists in the one to the exclusion of the other; for unless the
grace of God awakes a response in the will of man there is no true atonement.
But this response is just the fact which this type of theory tends either to overlook
or at least to describe with insufficient accuracy.9
The will of a murderer we may suppose is free in a sufficiently clear and robust sense
to support the agent’s moral responsibility before God. Philosophically, we must still
wonder how such discordance between human and divine will could have imaginably
occurred. If it is truly God’s will that murder not occur, how then is it even logically
possible for humanly willful murders to occur in blatant defiance of God’s will? We
cannot assume, on the basis of any distinction Collingwood mentions, that whatever
God wills to be the case can possibily be contradicted or contravened by the actual
state of affairs in the world that God is supposed to have created in the first place
through an all-powerful perfect act of divine will and moral decree.
The problem is easy to express, but surprisingly more difficult and elusive sat-
isfactorily to answer. If God wills there to be no murders, how can it be the case
that there are? If God does not will it, then how can an estrangement of human and
divine will arise when someone supposedly defies God’s will by actually committing
a murder? Collingwood investigates the topic of Free Will, in his tall letter orthogra-
phy again, which he interestingly pairs conceptually in the book’s final chapter with
the concept of Miracle. We might wonder whether such a turn too facilely covers
too much ground. Further pursuit would take the present inquiry in a fascinating but
side-tracked direction. The immediate point is only that if Collingwood’s ‘objective’
theory of the Atonement is accepted, then, in lieu of special pleading, it would also
need to incorporate that part of the atonement process in which the sinful mortal will’s
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., pp. 181–182.
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transgression takes place. Then God, paradoxically, must will a departure from the will
of God. The bounds of rationality are thereby strained in even the most philosophical
exposition of religious doctrine.
If powerful apologetics can be enlisted to help make sense of this apparent contradic-
tion, the resulting ‘objective’ account, at its best, intuitive plausibility issues aside, still
implies that God wills that the sinner exercise free will in transgressing against other
intended purposes of God’s will. The ‘objective’ account of the atonement process
that Collingwood criticizes makes God’s will causally and morally responsible for the
sins and related offenses supposedly against God’s will that human sinners sometimes
commit. The implication is logically trivially supported by the inconsistency that God
wills God’s will not to be fully actualized, from which literally any proposition is
validly deduced, ex falso quodlibet.
What might be called Collingwood’s Dilemma underlies most of his accompa-
nying discussion of ‘just punishment’. As further exploration into the interior of
these densely interrelated concepts, Collingwood argues first that we cannot have an
adequate concept of repentance or forgiveness, essential moments of the atonement
process occurring through God’s human incarnation, without an adequate concept of
just punishment. It is God’s just punishment for the sinner’s infractions against God’s
will for which God offers divine forgiveness to the sincerely repentant sinner seeking
atonement. God’s divinely just punishment is compared by Collingwood to what we
are inclined to consider just punishment in human affairs. The interest here is not to
try to learn about the divine from secular matters, nor to recognize signs of the divine
in secular circumstances. Nor is it Collingwood’s purpose to arrive at a moral or epis-
temic justification of the secular by appeal to the divine and its agreement therewith,
or vice versa. The objective theory of atonement that Collingwood hopes to develop
is nevertheless subject in its divine-favoring one-sidedness to the dilemma that issues
from the disjunction that sin is either forgiven or unforgiven by God. If sin is forgiven,
then Collingwood is concerned that God’s supposedly perfect justice must have gone
lax, no longer meeting the conceptual requirements of fully righteous justice. If sin
is unforgiven, then the failure of atonement is incompatible with sincere repentance
and the amending of ways on the part of a perfectly good, perfectly benevolent loving
fatherly or motherly divine compassionate godly Spirit. To be forgiven without fur-
ther ado and still receive just punishment, in order to preserve both concepts of God’s
perfect benevolence and God’s uncompromising divine justice, is not countenanced
as a logically possible option for the God of Collingwood’s Christianity.
The objective theory of Atonement as Collingwood describes it, for all these rea-
sons, seems logically incoherent. The fundamental concept is extended more consis-
tently to comprehend not only the sinner’s act of repentance. It must also in fairness
incorporate the process-originating sin, the act of transgressing against God’s will in
the first place. It is represented in the Garden of Eden story as the tree of forbidden
fruit. Collingwood’s Christian philosophical ideology is beset by the dilemma of just
punishment for sin, of God’s either forgiving or not forgiving sin for the sake of fore-
going justly deserved punishment. Completeness at the expense of logical consistency
is by no means an unprecedented trade-off in theoretical philosophy. It is interesting,
nonetheless, to see the dilemma play itself out in Collingwood’s unlikely application,
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involving an informal discursive analysis of the concept of religious atonement in rela-
tion to God’s incarnation in the person of Christ as the Incarnation = the Atonement.
Equally fallacious subjective account of atonement
What are we left with, permitting all such difficulties to pass for the moment, and
purely for the sake of argument, if we abandon the objective concept of atonement?
The unphilosophical view, one imagines Collingwood rejoining, is that atonement and
incarnation are two different things, related only insofar as the Incarnation provides
part of the bridge for the sinner’s atonement with the will of God.
God becomes flesh in Christ, as Collingwood’s Christian philosophy implies, as the
perfect fulfillment of God’s benevolent will to offer universal atonement to all sincerely
repentant sinners. Collingwood, in this vein, does some fancy side-stepping in order
to extend the Christian Gospel also to those who have never heard the redeeming
message. Why are the unwashed not simply damned to eternal hell? The Incarnation
of God in Christ’s flesh is the Atonement itself, Collingwood insists, not merely the
conduit by which a sinner may seek to attain atonement, on the philosophically most
interesting part of Collingwood’s synthesis that survives criticism. It is the expression
of God’s will for the world, that all other human (and angelic?) will be harmonized
with God’s own divine intentionality. That, apparently, is something that cannot itself
simply be willed, although it is God’s will that it should occur, and God’s will is
insuperable, omnipotently, cosmically causally efficacious.
On balance, there does not seem to be much hope for what Collingwood calls
the objective theory of the Atonement as a facet of the same process of discord and
redemption, bringing human will to stand at one with the relevant part of God’s will
made immortal flesh in the Incarnation. If the objective theory is a non-starter, what
more if anything can be said on behalf of Collingwood’s Atonement-Incarnation dual-
ity from the alternative, presumably exclusively subjective, side of the opposition that
Collingwood invokes rhetorically in order to transcend?
What Collingwood distinguishes as the ‘subjective’ theory of atonement honors the
insight that repentance from the human quarter in the several-stage process of divine
atonement must be the result and reflection of a free act of will on the part of the sinner
who in a deliberate act of iniquity has fallen out of oneness with God’s will. The mirror-
image subjective account of divine atonement, in contradistinction to the objective,
provides the other equally ineffectual half of a complete picture of atonement between
human sinners and God. Such a theory suffers explanatory disadvantages, according
to Collingwood, when it is detached from its objective component, just as the objective
does in isolation from the subjective. The subjective theory is inadequate considered
only in itself apart from the subjective, where neither aspect of the dual-sided nature
of the process in and of itself offers a satisfactory understanding of the logic and
metaphysics of divine atonement. Collingwood argues:
(b) The “subjective” theory insists on the attitude of man to God, and lays down
that since redemption involves an attitude or state of the subject’s will it cannot
without violence to his freedom be brought about by the act of another person,
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even if that other person be God. Grace as something merely proceeding from
God is not only a hypothesis, but a useless hypothesis; the fact to be explained
is the change, repentance, reformation of the individual, and this fact cannot be
experienced by reference to another’s actions. Nobody can change my mind for
me except myself. The question in short is not, What change has occurred in
God?—since God is and always was long-suffering and merciful. It is rather,
What difference has the life of Christ made in me? How has his example fired
me to imitate him, his life challenged me to new effort, his love called forth love
in me?10
The allure of the subjective theory of atonement is outweighed by its most significant
disadvantage. Collingwood describes the defect in the subjective theory as duplicating
the chief failure of the objective theory. Both objective and subjective theories describe
a moment in the process of divine atonement whereby either the repentant human
sinner sincerely seeking forgiveness or God as divine judge is entirely inactive as a
willful partner, the sinner falling out of accord with God’s will, and then entering back
into a redemptive state of being at-one. Collingwood rejects the subjective approach
to understanding divine atonement, even as a general philosophical concept, and more
certainly as Atonement = Incarnation = Christ, in the sense that he accepts and wants
to promote:
The tendency of subjectivism on the other hand is to assume that the righteous-
ness of man is independent of his relation to God; that man’s will is sanctified
by his own effort whether he is justified in the eyes of God or not. Here again
the fault lies in the absolute separation of man from God. God is not realised as
the one and only source of goodness; it is not understood that to will the right is
to unify one’s will with God’s.11
Collingwood’s philosophical point is that the process of atonement cannot be prop-
erly understood except as an interaction of conjointly participating moments of divine
and human will, where both play an essentially active role that no adequate under-
standing can afford to overlook or downplay. If we feature either the human or the
divine moment of the process at the expense of the other, then we are certain to mis-
understand the nature of atonement. The only proper, complete and undistorted view
for Collingwood is the holistic consideration of the complementary roles played by
sincere human repentance in dialectical interaction with perfect divine forgiveness, in
the course of attaining an atonement of mortal will with God’s divine infinite will.12
10 Ibid., p. 182.
11 Ibid., pp. 185–186.
12 As useful background companion to Collingwood’s metaphysics more generally, independently of its
applications in his philosophy of religion, refer to Collingwood 1998 [1940]. Among the secondary literature
see also Rubinoff 1972, and the essays collected in Krausz (1972).
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Collingwood’s religious conceptual synthesis of objective and subjective models
of atonement
Collingwood’s own dialectical narrative arc now swings from thesis (a), an objective
divine model of atonement, to antithesis (b), the subjective cousin of (a), to which
it is alike in all the wrong ways. Building on the fact of their failure, Collingwood
then proceeds to a more defensible synthesis (c). He believes the truth to be found not
in either extreme, but in a philosophical meeting of these ideological polestars in a
more encompassing synthesis in the concept of the Atonement that does not merely
combine objective with subjective elements:
(c) It must be obvious by now that of the two theories sketched above, each is an
abstraction; each emphasises one side of a reality in which both sides are present
and in which, as a matter of fact, both sides are one. The two sides must be
unified; but this cannot be effected by a compromise. A compromise is a middle
path between two extremes, and includes neither. The combination at which we
aim will assert both theories to the full while avoiding the errors which alone
keep them apart. As often happens in such cases, the two opposing theories are
based on the same error, and a little further analysis will show wherein this error
consists.13
Collingwood rejects the inherent myopia of both objective and subjective
approaches in trying to understand the enigma of atonement. He tars them both with
the same brush, attributing the exclusionary inner or external dichotomy, where true
explanation can only be sought by recognizing the complementarity of divine and
human will in bringing human will into agreement with God’s. Collingwood elabo-
rates upon his objection to (a) and (b) in these terms:
This is the fallacy common to the two views. Each alike holds that a given action
may be done either by God [(a) objective] or by man [(b) subjective], in either
case the other being inactive. This separation of the will of God from that of man
is fatal to any theory of Atonement, where the fact to be explained is that man
is redeemed not merely by his own act but also and essentially by God’s.14
It is worth remarking that it is in these salient passages, beginning with his discussion
of objective theories of atonement, and critically investigating what would appear to
be efforts to arrive at a correct philosophical understanding of the general concept of
atonement as a process, that Collingwood suddenly has the word ‘atonement’ grow a
13 Collingwood (1997 [1916], p. 184). A more recently published discussion by Kasuga (2011) argues that a
balanced interpretation implies that Collingwood seeks in his philosophy of religion to overcome a number of
traditional philosophical dualisms of ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’. I propose in contrast that Collingwood regards
the concept of religious atonement in particular as capable of being understood only by correctly applying an
extant dualism involving precisely the realism-idealism distinction. I do not see Collingwood as departing
from these two polar extremes, and I read him instead as preferring a synthetic but not merely syncretic
metaphysics, in which each of these opposite concepts lends an essential complementary dimension to a
more complete grasp of the dialectical dynamics of religious atonement.
14 Ibid., p. 185.
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capital letter, appearing thereafter in the text, as the proper names ‘Atonement’ and ‘the
Atonement’. This, for Collingwood, we know from previous passages, is ultimately
just one side of the dual-aspect person of Jesus, construed as God made flesh and
blood in the Incarnation.
Such vital religious phenomena are mysteries for others, in Collingwood’s judg-
ment, only insofar as they do not light upon the correct metaphysics. He seems to
think he has accomplished precisely this in his dual-aspect theory of the Atonement-
Incarnation. It might be replied, in stricter observance of Collingwood’s own dis-
tinctions, assuming that he has been well-served by his typesetter, that the objective
and subjective theories he criticizes were never intended as theories of Atonement,
in which God’s and human will are joined together as dual aspects of Jesus Christ,
for the sake of understanding the general concept of atonement, without the capital
‘A’. If not a frustrating series of inconsistent typos, if Collingwood understands the
capitalization of Atonement and Incarnation as we have interpreted it, logically, as
co-referential designations of Jesus, then we cannot have a satisfactory dual-aspect
account of Atonement, sporting a capital ‘A’, if we try to deny one aspect to the
exclusive emphasis of the other.
The model that Collingwood considers philosophically correct is rather one that
explains Atonement, here sporting the proper name capitalization, as an event in which
both human and divine will act in concert in a single fused moment, in which both
parts are equally active in different ways and playing very different complementary
roles. Collingwood adds:
A satisfactory theory of the Atonement seems to demand that the infusion of grace
from God does not forcibly and artificially bring about actually is a change of
mind in man. It is an event which only co-operation of the various wills involved
can effect at all. The error of the objective theory (or rather the error into which
that way of stating the truth is most liable to fall) is to regard God as wholly
active, man as wholly passive; and to forget that God’s purpose of redemption
is powerless apart from man’s will to be redeemed.15
Collingwood’s dual-aspect account of Atonement-Incarnation in the drama of
Christ is adapted to resolve what are otherwise independently impenetrable para-
doxes, when seen only from a single perspective emphasizing a single aspect to the
neglect of its corresponding aspect, to be appreciated from a similarly complementary
perspective. He continues:
The two things—righteousness and reconciliation with God—are really one and
the same, and to represent one as means to the other or vice versa, or to insist
on one and neglect the other, implies forgetting their identity and making an
arbitrary and false separation of the two.16
The synthesis of objective and subjective aspects of Atonement-Incarnation in
Collingwood’s Christian philosophy of religion is no mere bolting together of God’s
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 186.
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external objective relation to human will, as understood from the human perspective,
with the internal subjective change of heart by sinners seeking repentance and atone-
ment, and thereby desiring a reconciliation with God’s will. To project such a crude
combination is still to separate conceptually the main ingredients in the symbiosis
of human and divine wills that is supposed to occur in human-divine Atonement. As
Collingwood ingenuously argues:
Neither is it enough merely to combine the two sides which the foregoing the-
ories have separated. That would be to make the Atonement a combination of
two different acts—God’s forgiveness and man’s repentance—of which each is
peculliar to its own agent; it would fail to account for the essential unity of the
whole process, and taking the two sides as co-ordinate and equally vital, would
substitute an unintelligible dualism for what is really one fact.17
To summarize, Collingwood insists that, ‘The failure of the theories hitherto exam-
ined has been in every case due to this distinction within the Atonement of two sides,
God’s and man’s.’18 How this condition is achieved in Collingwood’s treatise is not so
much inferred from evident assumptions as articulated and explained philosophically.
Collingwood characterizes Atonement without attempt at further justification, saying
only in gender-biased terms, that, on the proposed dual-aspect model, ‘we shall be
able’ to describe Atonement as ‘the re-indwelling of the divine spirit in a man, who
has previously been alienated from it.’19
Necessity of Christ’s passion in Collingwood’s religious philosophy
Collingwood’s enthusiastic identifications of further religious concepts with Christ’s
inextricably intertwined dual nature as Atonement and Incarnation is simultaneously
metaphysically interesting and conceptually frustrating. It appears that once we have
atonement incarnate, then any and everything that is in any way difficult to understand
in the implied Christian ontology, or to reconcile with prephilosophical concepts of
God, is collapsed into the concept of Atonement-Incarnation in the life and death of
Christ.
The concept of Christ’s suffering, the passion, which we might win Collingwood’s
approval by designating the Passion, predicated on the Incarnation, is plausibly ana-
lyzed in the general framework of Collingwood’s idealist philosophy of religion.
Because Christ suffers as a human being, because Christ is the concrete symbolic
unification of human-divine Atonement in the putative historical fact of God’s Incar-
nation, Christ’s passion, physical punishment and execution by Roman legionnaires,
is joined together conceptually as one again by Collingwood reductively in the person
of a suffering sinless Christ. Collingwood explains:
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p. 187.
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But this universal fact of human life [that the suffering of others is ‘the influence
by which we come to our own repentance’] is, like all others, summed up and
expressed most completely in the divine manhood of the Christ. He alone is
always and perfectly penitent; for a sinful man cannot, while sinful, repent of his
own sins or any others; permanent penitence is only possible for a permanently
sinless mind. And this repentance of Christ is not only subjectively complete,
that is, unbroken by sins of his own, but objectively perfect also; it is incapable
of supplement or addition, sufficient to atone for the sins of the whole world, to
convert all sinners by the spectacle of God’s suffering.20
Collingwood does not pause to consider what a sin-free subject could possibly
have to be penitent about. If pressed, he might resort to Christ’s not being identical to
Suffering in the same way or in the same sense that Collingwood would have Christ
identified with the Atonement-Incarnation. To make exception, Collingwood would
need to speak again of the Suffering as in some sense encapsulating the entire run of
Christ’s life from miraculous birth to crucifixion.
It is an established problem of Christian apologetics that Collingwood inherits
rather than invents, one that is perhaps best addressed in Collingwood’s structure of
conceptual linkages in his philosophical reconstruction of Christianity, as Christ’s
vicarious penitence. Christ’s passion, as frequently remarked, is an assumed rather
than acquired guilt and blame. Christ takes on the role prescribed by lesser creatures
in a variation of the Hebrew Testament ceremony for symbolically removing sins
from human wrongdoers and transferring them to a living scapegoat, ‘punished’, if
that is the right way to think about it, by having its throat slit for a barbecue. Christ, as
Collingwood interprets this central component of Christian and other religious dogma,
fulfills a representational part of the divine ransom. The Atonement-Incarnation phys-
ically embodies both functions as victim and sacrificial lamb of God, on which the
sins of a repentant humankind have been vicariously disposed, and for the sake of
which the Atonement-Incarnation is deputized as a combined necessity of both God’s
divine justice and infinite compassion.
Collingwood’s discussion in this chapter, having accomplished its purpose in
explaining the limitations of exclusively objective and exclusively subjective under-
standings of divine atonement that might naturally be considered the culmination and
main message of the book, resolving their conflicting distortions in a holistic synthe-
sis of the cooperation of mortal will and God’s will, culminates in these thoughts of
Collingwood’s on the historical necessity of Christ’s passion:
Thus the supreme example of sinless suffering is…not merely an example set
up for our imitation; not merely a guarantee of the possibilities of human life.
It is an unfailing source and fountain of spiritual energy; it gives to those who
would imitate it the strength to work miracles, to cast aside their old selves and
to enter upon a new life prepared from the beginning of the world; for out of it
power goes forth to draw all men to itself.21
20 Ibid., p. 192.
21 Ibid., pp. 192–193. See also Johnson (1967), especially chapter V, pp. 45–51.
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Collingwood, depending on one’s point of view, advances or regresses in these
moments of Christian enthusiasm from philosophy to sermonette. A philosophical
investigation of the same cluster of concepts could undoubtedly proceed in contrast
by asking more open-mindedly, first, whether and if so. in what sense Christ’s passion
might be considered a source of spiritual energy. It might be inquired what meaning
Collingwood’s references to spiritual energy could reasonably have, whether and in
what sense there are miracles, and what if any relation might obtain between Christ’s
moral example and the possibilities of spiritual self-renewal that might be available
through association with Christ’s dual nature as Atonement and Incarnation, as events
were fated to transpire, resulting in his suffering the Passion.
If there is to be rapprochement between God’s divine infinite will and the finite
moral human will of sinners seeking redemption and divine forgiveness through sin-
cere repentance, then Collingwood believes that Christians, at some point in their
greater conceptual awareness as their sect dialectically progresses, must conclude that
only Christ’s painfully spilled blood can satisfy the demands of God’s Atonement-
Incarnation. If Christ is not sacrificed, in lieu at least of punishing a surrogate or
vicarious subject, then Collingwood’s Dilemma would have it that God’s divine jus-
tice is lax. This is why Christ as Atonement-Incarnation must suffer the Passion, in
order to prevent the contradiction of God’s perfect justice from falling short of just
punishment. Saving all grace-accepting humankind from death, and by implication
from hell, demonstrates God’s coeval infinite compassion. By this string of overlap-
ping conceptual connections, Collingwood perceives a philosophical relation between
Christian religious concepts of atonement, incarnation, Atonement-Incarnation, just
punishment, divine infinite compassion, and Christ’s physical abuse by provincial
Roman overlords in ancient Judea. As a punishment for every human being’s sins,
the requirements of God’s perfect justice and perfectly just punishment are fulfilled.
God is not unjust, his will is not mocked. With Christ’s crucifixion, the composite
Christian narrative continues, all sinners are compassionately offered eternal life, if
they only will to enter already in harmony with God’s will, into the next moment of
the Atonement dialectic, by sincerely repenting and being as instantly forgiven.
Sin and discord with God’s will as the original moment in Collingwood’s
dialectical concept of atonement
The need for Atonement, for bringing human and divine will back together after
discordance, seems to drive the need for God’s human Incarnation in Collingwood’s
account. If there were no need for Atonement, what need would there have been of
Incarnation, or for vicious execution of God’s avatar by Roman soldiers? Like other
Christians, Collingwood is obliged rationally to explain how a son of God could
have been cruelly tortured to death, except as part of some larger justifying design,
a reason or plan, with an internal inherent necessity. Christ = Incarnation of God
does not get murdered by accident, being in the wrong place at the wrong time,
or inciting resentment for his words and deeds. The suggestion here links essential
concepts together in a logically tight structure that contributes necessity to the events
surrounding Christ’s death by crucifixion, involving a process that takes place in
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definite stages, transpiring over certain moments of real time, as Collingwood rightly
reminds his readers.
The resulting picture is philosophically attractive. The distinguishable components
of the composite Christian narrative lock together in a satisfying way in Collingwood’s
philosophy. What is not adequately spoken of throughout Collingwood’s account,
however, as this critical examination has emphasized, is sin. Sin is nevertheless the
initiating event by which the dialectical process that Collingwood is otherwise keen to
explain gets started in the first place. Without sin, there is no need for atonement, and
hence no need for Atonement through the Incarnation and Passion of God incarnate.
Christians could only wonder then why Christ let himself be killed. Even Adam and
Eve had a couple of days of being at-one with God’s will, until they willed something
discordant with God’s will and fell out of grace. Nicely symbolized by a still popu-
lar metaphor in tasting the forbidden fruit, our first parents assuredly did something
naughty, something they believed to be contrary to God’s will. The Book of Genesis
narrative expresses the first break of previously innocent human will from God’s, as our
progenitors emerged from a more primitive animal consciousness. It is presented as an
incident of rebellious teenage will in almost any culture, at almost any time and place,
reacting to the contrary willfulness of a perceived individual subordinate-will-denying
or -inhibiting parental authority, no matter how well-meaning in intention.
The dialectic in Collingwood’s account must more completely describe a process
with distinct moments that cannot be set in motion unless human will takes the first
step. Mortal sinners must do so, however regrettably, by pitting themselves against and
thereby transgressing God’s will. A human being must choose to do something that the
individual believes to be contrary to God’s will. Then and only then can philosophy
of religion begin intelligibly to ask how and what it means for the will of sinners and
the will of God to be brought together in harmony again after their breach, and made
at-one. If the will of God and the will of human sinners do not first fall apart, as the
opening move in the Christian drama, then there is no ground for reconciliation, and
hence no initiation of the fulfilling Atonement or Atonement-Incarnation-with-Passion
moments in Collingwood’s dialectic of religious atonement. There would then be no
essential role for Christ to play in the great Collingwoodian dialectic, in which God
and human sinners enter into the most profound interrelation.
Were there no sin, there would be no Atonement, and hence no Incarnation. There
would likewise be no suffering Passion. The Incarnation of God as Christ, if Colling-
wood’s argument is correct, would never have taken place, if, speaking again coun-
terfactually, and purely for the sake of argument, there had never been any human
sin. The sinful, contrary-to-God’s-will, rebelliously willful actions of mortal sinners,
kickstart the dialectic of Atonement, and thereby, on Collingwood’s dual-aspect theory
of Atonement-Incarnation, necessitate God’s Incarnation as Jesus Christ. To return in
concluding to uncapitalized un-Collingwoodian orthography, there is no atonement
unless there is sin. Without sin, there is no need for atonement. With no need for
atonement, there is in turn no need for God’s incarnation, no need for Collingwood’s
Atonement-Incarnation embodied in the person of Christ. Some sins must therefore be
extraordinarily easy to commit, even by persons who are otherwise morally upright,
righteous, virtuous and honorable. We can, by some accounts, be born into inherited
sin, without having personally willfully committed any violation of God’s law, and
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even before we are capable as agents of committing any willful actions, of acting with
responsibility. One wonders whether it is a good or bad thing that there is not more
agreement among individual and collective religious sentiment as to the exact will of
God, to whatever it is that God wills, and however it is that we are supposed to be able
to know. Where the epistemological problem begins, there for the moment ends the
limited outlook of logical and metaphysical inquiry undertaken into Collingwood’s
extraordinary idealist Christian philosophy of religion.
Acknowledgments I am grateful to an anonymous journal referee for useful comments, criticisms and
suggestions for improvement.
References
Collingwood, R. G. (1968). In: L. Rubinoff (Ed.), Faith & reason: Essays in the philosophy of religion by
R.G. Collingwood. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
Collingwood, R. G. (1997 [1916]). Religion and Philosophy. Bristol: Thoemmes Press; reprint. Key Text
series, Classic Studies in the History of Ideas.
Collingwood, R. G. (1998 [1940]). In: R. Martin (Ed.), An essay on metaphysics. Revised edition, with an
introduction and additional material. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hogan, J. P. (1989). Collingwood and theological hermeneutics. Lanham: College Theology Society Studies
in Religion, University Press of America.
Johnson, P. (1998). R.G. Collingwood: An introduction. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
Johnson, W. M. (1967). The formative years of R.G. Collingwood. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Kasuga, J. (2011). A departure between two extremes: R.G. Collingwood’s religion and philosophy recon-
sidered. Idealistic studies, 41, 31–43.
Krausz, M. (Ed.). (1972). Critical essays on the philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. Oxford: The Clarendon
Press.
Rubinoff, L. (1970). Collingwood and the reform of metaphysics: A study in the philosophy of mind. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
123
